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The paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We ﬁnd that under an open-
loop information structure the incumbent anticipates entry by overinvesting, whereas in the Markov perfect
equilibrium the incumbent slightly underinvests in the period before the entry. The entry cost level where
entry accommodation passes into entry deterrence is lower in the Markov perfect equilibrium. Further we
ﬁnd that the incumbent’s capital stock level needed to deter entry is hump shaped as a function of the entry
time, whereas the corresponding entry cost, where the entrant is indifferent between entry and non-entry,
is U-shaped.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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0. Introduction
The paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dy-
amic setting. Initially the incumbent offers a homogenous product.
o increase production capacity the ﬁrm can invest to enlarge its cap-
tal stock. From some given future point in time on, another ﬁrm can
nter this market. In case entry takes place, a duopoly market arises
ith homogenous products. The question is how the incumbent in-
ests in order to anticipate the future entry threat. Basically, it can
hoose between a policy of entry deterrence and entry accommoda-
ion. In the latter case we also investigate what happens after the
econd ﬁrm has entered. Then two ﬁrms are in the market and both
an invest to increase production capacity.
First, we consider a situation where at some given future point in
ime an inevitable entry takes place. This allows us to establish the
ptimal entry accommodation policy.
However, under a Markov perfect equilibrium information struc-
ure the incumbent slightly underinvests in the period before entry
akes place. The reason is that in such a framework a higher mar-✩ This research was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Grant
25275-G11.
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377-2217/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article undet share is less persistent, because investment rates are directly
nﬂuenced by capital stocks of the own ﬁrm and of the competi-
or. The entrant just has to increase its own capital stock in order to
educe investments of the incumbent. A second reason for anticipa-
ory underinvestment by the incumbent is that proﬁts are lower in
Markov perfect equilibrium. This reduces the incentive to invest in
his market.
Second, we study a framework where market entry requires in-
urring a ﬁxed entry cost. This enables the incumbent to establish
he critical capital stock level it needs to build up in order to deter
ntry. Entry deterrence is optimal if it is not too costly to build up this
evel. We establish that for low entry cost entry accommodation will
esult, for intermediate levels of the entry cost the incumbent will
eter entry, and higher entry cost levels imply that the incumbent is
natural monopoly.
The paper essentially contributes to two streams of the litera-
ure. The ﬁrst stream considers an incumbent-entrant framework
here the incumbent has the choice between deterring and accom-
odating entry. The ﬁrst contributions are Dixit (1979, 1980), Spence
1977), being surveyed in Tirole (1988, Chap. 8). Maskin (1999) ex-
ends this literature by adding uncertainty and obtains that the in-
umbent should hold a higher capacity to deter the entrant. Abbring
nd Campbell (2007) construct a discrete time model and ﬁnd that
t may happen that incumbents will serve the total market if entry
arriers exist for new entrants. Fudenberg and Tirole (1983, 1986)
mploy a continuous-time model to ﬁnd that in a Markov perfect
quilibrium it is possible that a ﬁrm that has a head start in industryer the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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3 Note that the analysis of this paper is also possible for a positive initial capital stockcandeter entry (or at leastmobility) byoverinvestment. In theirmodel
the ﬁrms have linear investment costs. They further assume that each
ﬁrm has an upper bound on the amount of investment and argue
that this “serves as a proxy for the more realistic case of convex costs
of investment” (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1983, p. 230). Our paper in fact
considers this convex cost of investment case, which enables us to
explicitly consider how ﬁrms accumulate capital over time.
The second stream is the literature on duopoly differential games
with the emphasis on capital accumulation. Early contributions in-
clude Driskill and McCafferty (1989), Reynolds (1987, 1991), with an
overview being provided by Dockner, Jø rgensen, Long, and Sorger
(2000). Jun and Vives (2004) compare steady states of open-loop and
Markov perfect equilibria, where a full characterization is provided
in the linear-quadratic case. We do the same, but where Jun and
Vives concentrate on a symmetric game, we consider the incumbent-
entrant framework.
This paper extends the static literature on entry deterrence to a
dynamic framework. This has also been done in Huisman and Kort (in
press) but there ﬁrms were allowed to invest only once during a time
period of inﬁnite length. In our setting ﬁrms are allowed to invest
whenever they want, resulting in various incremental changes of the
capital stock. We ﬁnd that in an open-loop information structure the
incumbent anticipates entry by overinvesting, whereas the incum-
bent slightly underinvests in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. Further-
more, a policy of entry deterrence is more worthwhile to pursue in
the open-loop framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
where entry time is ﬁxed and the entrant can enter the market for
free. In Section3ﬁxed entry costs are added and the entrantmay enter
from some given time in the future onwards. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model with ﬁxed entry time
Consider an incumbent-entrant model, where, before (eventual)
entry takes place, themarket consists of onemonopolistic ﬁrm, being
the incumbent (ﬁrm 1). The ﬁrm that considers entry is denoted by
ﬁrm 2. This section considers a scenario where the entry time, T,
is exogenously given and known, and entry costs are negligible. This
implies thatwe take ﬁrm2’s entry at time T for granted, and our aim is
to analyze the effect of ﬁrm 2’s entry on ﬁrm 1’s investment behavior
prior to entry time T. Section 3 deals additionally with positive entry
costs and the timing of entry, provided it takes place at all (positive
entry costs may result in a proﬁtable policy of entry deterrence by
ﬁrm 1).
Firm 1’s corresponding model builds on the classical capital accu-
mulation models (see, among many others, Barucci, 1998; Eisner &
Strotz, 1963). The capital stock, K1(t), can be increased by capital in-
vestments I1(t), and decreases with a non-negative depreciation rate
δ > 0:
K˙1(t) = I1(t)− δK1(t), K1(0) = K10, (1)
where K10 denotes the initial capital stock at t = 0. From now on we
assume thatK10 = 0.2 The capital stockK1(t) is used to produce output
with a linear production function, i.e. F(K1(t)) = aK1(t) (without loss
of generality we chose a = 1). The price of output is determined by an
inverse demand function, i.e.
p(t) = A − K1(t), (2)
with A being a positive constant. Firm 1’s revenue therefore equals
R1(t) = p(t)K1(t) = (A − K1(t))K1(t). (3)2 The analysis of the model with positive K10 is completely analogous. Note that this
choice is no restriction to the model. Due to the Bellman principle the behavior of the
incumbent before time Twith positive K10 (i.e. K10 = ξ > 0, entry time T) is completely
the same compared to the situation in which the incumbent owns that capital stock at
some time t¯ with entry time horizon T + t¯.
o
c
F
c
F
eThe cost of investment consists of linear acquisition costs, bI1(t),
nd quadratic costs of implementation, c2 I
2
1(t), where b and c are
ositive constants.
At entry time T the market switches to competition. The present
alue of the incumbent’s proﬁts earned from there on depends on its
apital stock at the switching time K1(T), and, since the initial capital
tock of the entrant equals zero,3 we can denote these proﬁts by
(K1(T)). This results in the following optimization problem for the
ncumbent:
ax
I1(t)
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
(A − K1(t))K1(t)− bI1(t)− c
2
I21(t)
)
dt + e−rTS(K1(T))
s.t. K˙1(t) = I1(t)− δK1(t), K1(0) = 0, (4)
here r is the discount rate.
From time T on, two ﬁrms compete in an oligopolisticmarket with
omogenous goods. Consequently, the output price after ﬁrm 2 has
ntered, equals
(t) = A − K1(t)− K2(t) (5)
or both ﬁrms. The ﬁrms are both proﬁt maximizers, where the time
orizon is inﬁnite. Putting things together we arrive at a classical
apital accumulation game as presented in Reynolds (1987),4 i.e.
Firm 1 : max
I1(t)∫ ∞
T
e−rt
(
(A − K1(t)− K2(t))K1(t)− bI1(t)− c
2
I21(t)
)
dt,
Firm 2 : max
I2(t)∫ ∞
T
e−rt
(
(A − K1(t)− K2(t))K2(t)− bI2(t)− c
2
I22(t)
)
dt,
s.t. K˙1(t) = I1(t)− δK1(t),
K˙2(t) = I2(t)− δK2(t), K2(T) = 0. (6)
n the same paper this differential game is solved for the open-loop
nd feedback (or Markov perfect) case. Therefore, we will not re-
eat the analysis, but only some highlights and key results we need
or our economic analysis (see Appendices A–C). Due to the linear
uadratic structure it is possible to obtain an analytical solution. This
s presented in the following sections for both (open-loop andMarkov
erfect equilibrium) scenarios.
.1. Analysis and economic interpretation (Markov perfect
quilibrium case)
In the remainder of the paper the superscriptsM,MP, andOdenote
ariables that correspond to monopoly (M), or Markov perfect (MP)
nd open-loop commitment structure (O).
This section deals with a Markov perfect equilibrium structure in
he duopoly game that arises after ﬁrm 2 has entered. As demon-
trated in Reynolds (1987), the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman function
as 6 solutions, where one is asymptotically stable (for details we re-
er to Reynolds (1987)). Comparing the steady state solutions reveals
hat the capital stock as well as the investments of the monopolist
lways exceed that of a duopoly ﬁrm (Markov perfect equilibrium),
.e.
ˆM
1 =
A − b(r + δ)
2 + δc(r + δ) >
A − b(r + δ)
3 + δc(r + δ)− σ
π−c(r+δ)
= KˆMP1 ,f the competitor. However, it is more reasonable to assumewithin this model that the
apital stock has to be built up after the entrance.
4 For other contributions we refer to Dragone, Lambertini, and Palestini (2010),
ershtman and Muller (1984), Reynolds (1991). A capital accumulation game with a
apital stock with vintage structure has been dealt with in Wrzaczek and Kort (2012).
or a profound overview on dynamic capital accumulation games we refer to Dockner
t al. (2000), Long (2010).
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there σ < 0 and π < 0 are parameters of the value function (see
eynolds, 1987 for details). The superscript MP refers to values from
he competition period with the Markov perfect equilibrium struc-
ure. Optimal investments are given by
i =
β + πKi + σKj − b
c
, (7)
here β > 0 is another parameter of the value function. We thus ob-
ain thatﬁrm i’s investmentsdependnegatively on theownandon the
ompetitor’s capital stock. The reason for the ﬁrst result is that proﬁt
s concave in Ki, i.e. marginal revenue is decreasing. Furthermore, in-
estment depends negatively on the competitor’s capital stock, since
his stock has a negative effect on the output price, thereby reducing
he incentive to invest in this market.
By applying the result of the Markov perfect equilibrium (see
eynolds, 1987) we obtain the following concave salvage value
unction:
(K1) = α + βK1 + π
2
K21 ,
here α > 0. The problem of the incumbent before entry takes place
as not been analyzed so far in a continuous dynamic framework. As
e assume within this section that the entry time T is ﬁxed, we are
ble to derive the capital stock of the incumbent at time T explicitly
nd obtain 5
1(T) =
(
KˆM1 +
1
N
[
− KˆM1
(
ξM1 − ξM2
)
eξ
M
1 T
−1
2
(
μˆM1 − β
)(
ξM1 − r − δ
)(
ξM2 − r − δ
)
(1 − e(ξM1 −ξ2)T)
])
×
(
1 − 1
2N
(
ξM1 − r − δ
)(
ξM2 − r − δ
)
(1 − e(ξM1 −ξM2 )T)π
)−1
,
(8)
here
= (ξM1 − r − δ)− (ξM2 − r − δ)e(ξM1 −ξM2 )T . (9)
ere ξM1 and ξ
M
2 denote the positive and negative eigenvalues of the
teady state of the incumbent problem before entry takes place.
.2. Analysis and economic interpretation (open-loop case)
After the entry time, the resulting differential game between two
rmswith open-loop information structure has a unique equilibrium,
hich turns out to be a saddle path (see Reynolds, 1987 for details).
he resulting steady state capital stock is smaller than that of the
onopolist and the one corresponding to theMarkov perfect duopoly
see Reynolds, 1987 or Dragone et al., 2010), i.e.
ˆM
1 =
A − b(r + δ)
2 + δc(r + δ) >
A − b(r + δ)
3 + δc(r + δ)− σ
π−c(r+δ)
= KˆMP1
>
A − b(r + δ)
3 + δc(r + δ) = Kˆ
O
1 . (10)
t the end of the period prior to the entry of ﬁrm 2, ﬁrm 1 has the
ollowing concave salvage function, which equals the value function
f the duopolistic period at that time (for a derivation we refer to
ppendix B):
(K1) = Y1 + Y2K1 + Y3K21
here Y1 > 0, Y2 > 0 and Y3 < 0 (for the full expressions of these
arameters we again refer to Appendix B).5 Take the explicit expression of the capital stock with ﬁnite time horizon ((40) of
ppendix A) together with the salvage value implied by the Markov perfect commit-
ent scenario (see Reynolds, 1987) and solve the equation with respect to K1(T). Note
hat in the open-loop scenario the investments of ﬁrm 2 (the competitor) are treated
s functions of time only (i.e. ﬁrm 1 does not include the effect of the capital stocks on
he optimal investments in the calculation of the optimal strategy).
c
M
bBy following the same steps (with different salvage value function)
s in the Markov perfect equilibrium case, we again can calculate the
apital stock of ﬁrm 1 at the entry time, i.e.
1(T) =
(
KˆM1 +
1
N
[
− KˆM1
(
ξM1 − ξM2
)
eξ
M
1 T
−1
2
(
μˆM1 − Y2
)(
ξM1 − r − δ
)(
ξM2 − r − δ
)
(1 − e(ξM1 −ξM2 )T)
])
×
(
1− 1
2N
(
ξM1 − r− δ
)(
ξM2 − r− δ
)
(1 − e(ξM1 − ξM2 )T)2Y3
)−1
,
(11)
here N is given by (9).
.3. Comparison
This section compares the results of the Markov perfect and the
pen-loop solutions in the case of ﬁxed entry time T. We choose the
ame parameter values as in Reynolds (1987), i.e.
= 0.1, δ = 0.05, c = 10, b = 100, A = 60. (12)
hese imply the following value function parameter values for the
arkov perfect equilibrium:
= 1769.8, β = 179.0, γ = −17.09,
π = −3.26, σ = −1.2, 	 = 0.17, (13)
nd for the open-loop case
1 = 0.3787, B1 = 48.4420, C1 = 1936 (14)
here
2K
2
1 + B2K1 + C2, (15)
enotes ﬁrm 1’s value function in the second period in the open-loop
ase (for the detailed expressions we refer to Appendix C).
Figs. 1 and 2 depict the time paths for both (above: Markov per-
ect, below: open-loop) scenarios. The left panels illustrate the capital
tocks and the right ones the investments of both ﬁrms. Firm 2 en-
ers either at T = 25 (Fig. 1) or at T = 5 (Fig. 2). Further, we compare
he optimal investment behavior of the incumbent (black line) with
ow the incumbent should invest if it was unaware of a ﬁrm entering
t some future time T6. The resulting “non-anticipative” investment
ehavior is denoted by the dashed line.
In case of a relatively late entry time T (Fig. 1), the incumbent
pproaches the monopolistic steady state (grey line) before it starts
o anticipate ﬁrm 2’s entry. However, anticipation is considerably
ifferent depending on the assumed commitment scenario. In the
pen-loop one the anticipation effect is positive, i.e. the incumbent
verinvests before the entry time. In the Markov perfect equilibrium
t is slightly negative, i.e. the incumbent follows very close the non-
nticipative investment path, where it slightly underinvests before
ntry takes place.
In case of an earlier entry time (Fig. 2), the incumbent stays far be-
ow the monopolistic steady state, because there is not enough time
o reach it before entry takes place. In the open-loop case the posi-
ive anticipation effect is that strong, that the capital stock increases
onsiderably faster compared to the non-anticipative case and to the
arkov perfect equilibrium.
The form of the anticipation (positive or negative) cannot
e shown analytically. Instead, we numerically tested the ranges6 That is the incumbent behavior when T = + in (4).
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Fig. 1. Capital stocks and optimal investments of both ﬁrms over time (exogenous T = 25), above: Markov perfect, below: open-loop.
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Vr ∈ [0,0.5] , δ ∈ [0,0.5], c ∈ [0,10], b ∈ [0,250] and A ∈ [0,60], and
found that the just described behavior is robust against parameter
changes and differs only in the magnitude.
The interpretation of the observed behavior is as follows. Under
open-loop, ﬁrms cannot inﬂuence each other’s capital stock devel-
opment so directly as in the Markov perfect equilibrium. Therefore,
a large K1 at the entry time pays off for ﬁrm 1. Firm 2 has no di-
rect means to negatively inﬂuence ﬁrm 1’s investment. A large K1
reduces ﬁrm 2’s co-state so that ﬁrm 2’s investments are also re-
duced. This will lead to a slower growth of ﬁrm 2 toward its steady
state.
In the Markov perfect equilibrium there is a direct effect of capital
stock of both ﬁrms on each other’s investment. That implies that ef-
fects of an initial capital stock are less persistent. Firm2 easily reduces
ﬁrm1’s investment, because, according to Eq. (7), ﬁrm2’s capital stock
directly enters the equation for ﬁrm 1’s investment rate. Also proﬁts
in the Markov perfect equilibrium are lower due to increased strate-
gic interactions formed by the over-investments of both ﬁrms. This
all makes that there is less incentive to have a positive anticipation
phase before the start of the duopoly period. The relatively lower
proﬁts corresponding to the Markov perfect equilibrium even result
in a slightly negative anticipation phase.. The model with entry cost
In the sections beforewe assumed that the entry time T is ﬁxed and
ntry is taken for granted (Section2).Nowwe introducepositive entry
osts F, and address the generalization such that from a certain time T˜
n, ﬁrm 2 can decide itself whether andwhen it wants to enter. If ﬁrm
’s payoff is not high enough to compensate for the entry costs, it will
ot enter the market. Firm 1 knows this and could adjust its strategy,
.e. overinvest, to deter entry. Therefore, ﬁrm 1’s possibilities are (i)
o accommodate entry like in the previous section, or (ii) to deter
ntry. It will choose that option that maximizes its own payoff. In the
ollowing two sections we present the Markov perfect equilibrium
nd the open-loop case, respectively. We end with a comparison of
he two cases.
.1. Analysis and interpretation (Markov perfect equilibrium)
In the Markov perfect equilibrium ﬁrm 2 has the following entry
ondition:
MP
2 − F > 0 : enter,
VMP2 − F ≤ 0 : do not enter, (16)
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ﬁhere VMP2 denotes ﬁrm 2’s value function at time t. The left hand
ide of (16) represents the value of ﬁrm 2 if it enters themarket. If the
alue is positive (non-positive), it should enter (not enter).
Given ﬁrm2’s value function (see Reynolds, 1987), the above entry
ondition (16) at the entry time T˜ thus reads
	
2
K21 + γ K1 + α − F > 0, (17)
n which ﬁrm 2’s own capital stock does not occur, since K2(T˜) = 0.
or the parameter values (12), and also for the ranges r ∈ [0,0.5],
∈ [0,0.5], c ∈ [0,10], b ∈ [0,250] and A ∈ [0,60], we obtain ε > 0,
< 0 and α > 0. The negative root,
critMP
1 :=
1
	
(
− γ −
√
γ 2 − 2	(α − F)
)
(18)
enotes ﬁrm 1’s capital stock level where ﬁrm 2’s entry condition is
inding. If ﬁrm 1 chooses a capital stock that is below KcritMP1 , ﬁrm 2
as a positive value of the second period and will enter the market.
or K1 ≥ KcritMP ﬁrm 2 will not enter.1Based on (18), two boundaries on the entry costs can be derived,
.e.
MP := α − γ
2
2	
, F
MP
:= α. (19)
These boundaries are illustrated in Fig. 3, and can be interpreted
s follows. The decreasing curve in the ﬁgure represents the value
unction of ﬁrm 2 depending on ﬁrm 1’s capital stock at the time of
ossible entry, i.e. 	2K
2
1 + γ K1 + α. From the ﬁgure we can conclude
hat, if the entry costs are always smaller than FMP, ﬁrm 1 cannot
o anything against ﬁrm 2’s entry. If the entry costs are higher than
MP ﬁrm 1 can turn ﬁrm 2’s total payoff (value function minus the
ntry costs) negative, implying that ﬁrm 2 will not enter. However,
f the entry costs are higher than ﬁrm 2’s value function in case of a
ero capital stock of ﬁrm 1 at the entry time, ﬁrm 2’s total payoff will
lways be negative and will never enter the market. This boundary
s plotted as F
MP
in the above expression and in the ﬁgure. Hence,
rm 1 has to choose between entry deterrence and accommodation
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Fig. 3. Value function of ﬁrm 2 depending on ﬁrm 1’s capital stock (Markov perfect
case).
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monly if FMP ≤ F ≤ FMP. Here it has to be remarked that some entry
cost level FM ∈ (FMP, FMP) exists , such that for F ∈ [FM, FMP] ﬁrm 2
already chooses not to enter if ﬁrm 1 just chooses the monopoly
investment time path. For costs of entry belonging to this interval
we have a scenario where ﬁrm 1 is a natural monopoly. However,
for F ∈ [FMP, FM) entry deterrence requires higher investments than
what ﬁrm 1 would do in case of a monopoly, and the question is then
whether this overinvestment is not too costly. For F < FMP ﬁrm 2will
always enter. On the other hand, for F > F
MP
ﬁrm 2 will never enter.
Let us deﬁne KM1 (T˜)as the capital stock at T˜ if ﬁrm 1would behave
as a monopolist forever. In the current model the market structure
develops over time in the following way:
• KM1 (T˜) ≥ KcritMP: It is not necessary for the monopolist to adapt
the monopolistic strategy, since ﬁrm 2 will not enter. This is the
natural monopoly scenario that occurs when F  FM.
• KM1 (T˜) < K
critMP: If ﬁrm 1 behaves as monopolist, ﬁrm 2 will enter
(if F < FM). Then ﬁrm 1 has to compare the payoffs resulting from
(i) the case where it accommodates entry (like in the previous
section) and ﬁrm 2 enters at T˜ with that from (ii) the ﬁrm deters
entry, i.e. it increases the capital stock such that it equals KcritMP
at time T˜, and does not fall below this level for t > T˜.
In order to ﬁnd out whether it is proﬁtable to raise its capital
stock to KcritMP (such that ﬁrm 2 does not enter), it is necessary to
calculate the corresponding value functions. Let VMP,i1 denote ﬁrm 1’s
value function when it does not raise its capital stock to KcritMP, or
higher (ﬁrm 2 does enter the market). On the other hand, let VMP,ii1
denote ﬁrm 1’s value function when it does raise its capital stock to
that level (ﬁrm 2 does not enter). We derived the following analytical
expressions:
VMP,i1 = −
(
A − KˆM1
)
KˆM1
e−rT˜ − 1
r
− (A − 2KˆM1 )KˆM1 e(ξM2 −r)T˜ − 1ξM2 − r
− (KˆM1 )2 e(2ξM2 −r)T˜ − 1
2ξM2 − r
− b
(
−δKˆM1
e−rT˜ − 1
r
− 2Kˆ
M
1
c
(
ξM2 − r − δ
) e(ξM2 −r)T˜ − 1
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)
− c
2
(
−δ2(KˆM1 )2 e−rT˜ − 1r − 4δ
(
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)2
c
(
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) e(ξM2 −r)T˜ − 1
ξM2 − r+ 2(Kˆ
M
1 )
2
c2(ξM2 − r − δ)2
e(2ξ
M
2 −r)T˜ − 1
2ξM2 − r
)
+ e−rT˜
(π
2
(
KˆM1 (1 − eξ
M
2 T˜)
)2 + β(KˆM1 (1 − eξM2 T˜))+ α)
MP,ii
1 = −
(
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)
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e−rT˜ − 1
r
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(
ξM1 − r − δ
)
2
× e
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+2c¯1c¯2 e
(ξM1 +ξM2 −r)T˜ − 1
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+ e
−rT˜
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(
(A − KcritMP)KcritMP − bδKcritMP − cδ
2
2
(KcritMP)2
)
(20)
here c¯i (for i= 1, 2) are functions of the critical capital stock derived
n (23), i.e. c¯i = c¯i(KcritMP), for i = 1, 2, (see Appendix C).
Let us consider the market situation for the same parameter val-
es as in the benchmark scenario (see p. 8). Then we get FMP = 910
nd F
MP = 1769.8. If the entry costs are between these two bound-
ries, ﬁrm 1 must choose whether to deter or to accommodate entry.
able 1 summarizes the optimal actions of both ﬁrms and the market
mplications for different values of the entry cost. If F > FMP, ﬁrm 1 is
n principle able to prevent ﬁrm 2 from a market entry. However, if F
s slightly above FMP, that is too costly, because it requires too much
nvestments. At FMPI = 1333.2, ﬁrm 1 is indifferent between entry ac-
ommodation and entry deterrence, i.e. raising the capital stock to
critMP. For F > FMPI it is proﬁtable for ﬁrm 1 to deter entry. Hence,
rm 1 is a monopolist, but a constrainedmonopolist in the sense that
apital stock must be large enough to prevent entry of the other ﬁrm.
he smaller is F, the more proﬁtable is entry for ﬁrm 2, which implies
hat themore constrained the incumbent is, i.e. the larger is the lower
ound of the capital stock that deters entry.
The long run optimal steady state capital stock for the situation
hat arises after T˜ is depicted in Fig. 4 for different entry costs F,
here T˜ = 25. Analogous to the table we see that for low F ﬁrm 2
nters and both ﬁrms will admit the steady state capital stock of the
uopoly under the Markov perfect scenario. For F = FMPI ﬁrm 1 is in-
ifferent between entry deterrence and entry accommodation. This
mplies that both steady state capital stocks are optimal, i.e. that of
he duopoly and KcritMP (the minimal level needed to deter entry).
or F > FMPI ﬁrst the steady state capital stock equals K
critMP, which
s a decreasing function of F. For even higher values of F, the curve
f the critical capital stock crosses the steady state of the monopo-
istic scenario (i.e. KcritMP = KM). For values of F higher than where
critMP = KM, ﬁrm 1 is a natural monopoly. This means that it is op-
imal to behave as a monopolist, since this is enough to deter entry.
o summarize, we observe that ﬁrm 1 accommodates entry for low
alues of F, deters entry for intermediate values of F, and is a natural
onopolist for high values of F.
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Table 1
Optimal actions of both ﬁrms for different entry costs (T˜ = 25, K10 = 0, Markov perfect).
F KcritMP Implication
<910 – Firm 2 will enter
1200 46.1973 Increasing the K1(T˜) to KcritMP is too expensive, ﬁrm 2 will enter
1300 32.8603 Increasing the K1(T˜) to KcritMP is too expensive, ﬁrm 2 will enter
1333.2 30.0334 Firm 1 is indifferent
1350 28.6452 Firm 1 increases the K1(T˜) to KcritMP , ﬁrm 2 will not enter
1400 24.6639 Firm 1 increases the K1(T˜) to KcritMP , ﬁrm 2 will not enter
1450 20.8814 Firm 1 behaves as usualmonopolist, ﬁrm 2 will never enter
1550 13.8099 Firm 1 behaves as usualmonopolist, ﬁrm 2 will never enter
>1769.8 – Firm 1 behaves as usualmonopolist, ﬁrm 2 will never enter
1200 1250 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
entry costs
e
qu
ilib
riu
m
 c
ap
ita
l s
to
ck
 a
fte
r e
ar
lie
st
 e
nt
ry
f2 enters:
entry accomodation
f2 does not enter:
entry deterrence
f2 does not enter:
blockaded entry
Fig. 4. Equilibrium capital stocks after the switching time T˜ for different entry costs F
(Markov perfect).
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For the open-loop case ﬁrm 2 has the following entry condition:
O
2 − F > 0 : enter,
VO2 − F ≤ 0 : do not enter, (21)
here VO2 denotes ﬁrm2’s open-loop value function at t. The interpre-
ation is analogous to that of the Markov perfect equilibrium case. As
rm 2 starts with a zero capital stock, the left hand side only depends
n the capital stock of ﬁrm 1. It is straightforward7 to transform the
hs of (21) into a quadratic form in K1(T˜), i.e.
2K
2
1 + B2K1 + C2 − F. (22)
he negative root of (22),
critOL := 1
2A2
(
− B2 −
√
B22 − 4A2(C2 − F)
)
(23)
enotes the critical capital stock value of ﬁrm 1 where ﬁrm 2’s entry
ondition is binding. For the parameter values (12), and also for the
anges r ∈ [0,0.5], δ ∈ [0,0.5], c ∈ [0,10], b ∈ [0,250] andA ∈ [0,60],
e obtain A2 > 0, B2 < 0 and C2 > 0, implying that the lhs of (22) is a
-shaped function. By using the above form (23) we again obtain two
oundaries on the entry costs, i.e.
OL := C2 −
B22
4A2
, F
OL
:= C2. (24)
he interpretation is analogous to the Markov perfect equilibrium,
nly the levels are different.
The value functions of ﬁrm 1 for the case where the capital stock
s increased to KcritOL (in order to deter entry) and for the case where7 The way to derive the value function is straightforward, but requires very tedious
nalysis. The exact values of the parameters can be found in Appendix C.
F
T
mrm 1 accommodates entry (i.e. ﬁrm 2 enters the market) read (VO,i1
hen it accommodates entry, VO,ii1 when it deters entry):
VO,i1 = −
(
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(25)
here c¯i (for i= 1, 2) are functions of the critical capital stock derived
n (23), i.e. c¯i = c¯i(KcritOL) (for i = 1, 2). As before, the complete ex-
ressions for the derived value function parameters can be found in
ppendix C.
We again adopt the parameter values presented in (12). The
oundaries for the entry cost equal
OL = 1490.5 and FOL = 1936. (26)
he optimal actions by both ﬁrms for several choices of F are sum-
arized in Table 2. Here possible entry can take place from T˜ = 25
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Table 2
Optimal actions of both ﬁrms for different entry costs (T˜ = 25, K10 = 0, open-loop).
F Kcrit OL Implication
<1490.5 – Firm 2 will enter
1500 46.3243 Increasing the K1(T˜) to Kcrit OL is too expensive, ﬁrm 2 will enter
1524.1 39, 3518 Firm 1 is indifferent
1550 34.4254 Firm 1 increases the K1(T˜) to Kcrit OL , ﬁrm 2 will not enter
1600 27.3562 Firm 1 increases the K1(T˜) to Kcrit OL , ﬁrm 2 will not enter
1650 21.7915 Firm 1 increases the K1(T˜) to Kcrit OL , ﬁrm 2 will not enter
1700 17.0499 Firm 1 behaves as usualmonopolist, ﬁrm 2 will never enter
1800 9.0344 Firm 1 behaves as usualmonopolist, ﬁrm 2 will never enter
1900 2.2397 Firm 1 behaves as usualmonopolist, ﬁrm 2 will never enter
>1936 – Firm 1 behaves as usualmonopolist, ﬁrm 2 will never enter
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Fig. 5. Equilibrium capital stocks after the switching time T˜ for different entry costs F
(open-loop).
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Fig. 6. Equilibrium capital stocks after the switching time T˜ for different entry costs F.
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aonwards. The behavior is analogous to the Markov perfect equilib-
rium case. The only difference is that both FOL and F
OL
are higher than
in the Markov perfect equilibrium. The reason for this is that, if the
duopoly has an open-loop structure, proﬁts for the ﬁrms are higher.
Consequently, the entry condition switches for higher entry costs F,
compared to the Markov perfect equilibrium. Or, to put it differently,
for given F ﬁrm 1 needs to overinvest more to deter entry of ﬁrm 2.
Therefore, it starts doing this for larger values of F and needs to keep
on doing it for larger values of F than in the Markov perfect equilib-
rium. Fig. 5, having the same qualitative characteristics as Fig. 4 for
the Markov perfect equilibrium, depicts long run steady state values
of ﬁrm 1 as a function of F for the different cases.
3.3. Comparison
The difference between the Markov perfect and the open-loop
case is illustrated in Fig. 6, where the long-run steady state capital
stock of ﬁrm 1 is depicted for different entry costs F (Markov perfect:
dashed line, open-loop: solid line). If the entry costs are very low,
ﬁrm 2 will deﬁnitely enter. In that case the steady state capital stock
is higher in the Markov perfect equilibrium due to strategic interac-
tions resulting in higher overinvestments (see Reynolds, 1987). For
values of F (slightly) larger than FMPI it is optimal for the incumbent to
increase its capital stock to KcritMP, and, as explained before, KcritMP
is decreasing in F. When KcritMP gets smaller than the monopolistic
steady state capital stock KˆM1 , it is optimal for ﬁrm 1 to behave as a
usual unconstrained monopolist.
If we compare open-loop to Markov perfect, we know that in the
latter case proﬁts are lower due to strategic interactions resulting in
higher overinvestments. This implies that in the case of open-loop an
entry deterrence policy requires that the incumbent should acquire
a larger capital stock (KcritOL) to keep ﬁrm 2 out of the market. Thisakes that entry deterrence is only proﬁtable for larger values of F,
nd this results in the existence of an F-domain (FOLI , F
M,OL) where
nder open-loop ﬁrm 1 has a large capital stock to deter entry, while
nderMarkovperfect ﬁrm1already is a naturalmonopoly. As a result,
or F ∈ (FOLI , FM,OL) the steady state capital stock under open-loop is
igher than under Markov perfect. Usually in duopoly the Markov
erfect capital stock exceeds the open-loop one. The threat of a new
ntry reverses this well known relationship here.
In the analysis before we have assumed that ﬁrm 2 can enter
rom T˜ = 25 onwards. We now address the question what happens
f T˜ changes. The result is plotted in Fig. 7. In this ﬁgure Kcrita(T˜)
a ∈ {MP,OL}) represents the maximal capital stock ﬁrm 1 wants to
uild up to prevent entry. Then FaI (T˜) is the entry cost where ﬁrm 2
s indifferent between entry and non-entry at time T˜, given that ﬁrm
’s capital stock equals Kcrita(T˜). So, ﬁrst Kcrita(T˜) is determined, and
ased on that we establish FaI (T˜).
The dashed lines represent the critical capital stock Kcrita as a
unction of T˜, whereas the solid lines denote the corresponding en-
ry costs FaI . Obviously, the dependence on T˜ is non-trivial. K
crita is
ump-shaped and the corresponding FaI U-shaped between T˜ = 0 and
pproximately T˜ = 40. The following two effects are responsible:
(i) Investment cost effect: First, consider the case T˜ = 0. Since we
have zero initial capital stock for the incumbent, i.e. K10 = 0,
ﬁrm 2 will enter whenever F < F
a
. If T˜ goes up, ﬁrm 1 has
the time to invest and build up a capital stock before eventual
entry takes place. Note that a fast growth of K1 is costly due
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Fig. 7. Dependence of the switching costs (where ﬁrm 1 is indifferent) and the corresponding Ka (a ∈ {CFB,COL}) on T˜ (rhs: Markov perfect, lhs: open-loop).
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ato convex adjustment costs. The larger T˜ , the cheaper for ﬁrm
1 to reach a certain capital stock value, which explains why
Kcrita(T˜) is increasing for low values of T˜. Since ﬁrm 2’s payoff
after entry is decreasing in both F and K1, the F for which ﬁrm
2 is indifferent between entry and non-entry, is decreasing in
Kcrita(T˜). So Kcrita(T˜) being increasing for small T˜ implies that
FaI (T˜) is decreasing there.
(ii) Discounting effect: This effect results in a small Kcrita(T˜)when
T˜ is large. This is because entry far in the future does not affect
ﬁrm 1’s payoff that much due to discounting. This implies that
the incentive for ﬁrm 1 to incur additional investment costs is
low. Hence, Kcrita(T˜) is decreasing in T˜ when T˜ is large. Since,
as explained above, FaI is a decreasing function of K
crita, FaI (T˜)
is increasing when T˜ is large.
Taking both effects together results in the U-shaped form of FaI .
or early potential entry times the investment cost effect dominates,
nd after that the discount effect is stronger. If T˜ exceeds a certain
ime (approximately 30 in the Markov perfect equilibrium, and 40
n the open-loop case) the corresponding Kcrita falls below the long-
un capital stock level of the monopolist. Then we are in the natural
onopoly scenario, where it is not necessary for the incumbent to
dapt its strategy in order to prevent entry.
Comparing the Markov perfect equilibrium with the open-loop
ne again shows that the maximal entry cost where ﬁrm 2 wants
o enter, is higher for the open-loop case. The reason for that is as
iscussed before: open-loop gives higher duopoly proﬁts.
Fig. 7 tells the incumbent under all circumstances what is optimal
o do: entry deterrence or entry accommodation. If T˜ is such that
crita is increasing, the incumbent simply compares the entry cost to
a
I (T˜). If F > F
a
I (T˜), the incumbent deters entry. To do so it establishes
hich FaI is equal to F, and then determines which K
crita corresponds
o this FaI . The incumbent can now deter entry by building up K such
hat K(T˜) = Kcrita(FaI ). For F < FaI (T˜), the corresponding Kcrita(T˜) is too
igh, implying that it is too costly to increase capital stock to that
evel. Consequently, the incumbent accommodates entry.
If T˜ is such that Kcrita is decreasing, i.e. T˜ > T˜max, the incumbent
rst determines which FaI is equal to the current entry cost F. Then it
stablishes which Kcrita corresponds to this FaI , because in this way
t knows which capital stock level needs to be build up such that
rm 2 will not enter. If this Kcrita exceeds Kcrita(T˜max), the incumbent
ccommodates entry. However, if Kcrita is smaller than Kcrita(T˜max),
he incumbent deters entry. Here one should realize that, as time
asses, the time it lasts until ﬁrm 2 may enter, which we denote by
˜(t),decreases. It holds that T˜(t) = T˜ − t. This implies that, indeed, T˜(t)
ecreases over time and becomes equal to T˜max at time t = T˜ − T˜max.
nd at this point in time the incumbent wants to invest such that
aximally Kcrita(T˜max) is the capital stock at T˜, if this deters entry.. Conclusions
The paper considers the problem of a ﬁrm that is currently a mo-
opolist but where in the future another ﬁrm can enter the market
nd offer the same product. As soon as this happens, ﬁrms will com-
ete with the result that proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrm will diminish.
n particular, the topic of this paper is how the current monopolist
ill anticipate this future entry threat.
Essentially there are two strategies for the incumbent to deal with
future entry threat. First, the ﬁrm can deter entry. This requires
uge investments to increase production capacity. Consequently the
rm raises output, which reduces output price, which in turn makes
he market less proﬁtable for a potential entrant. This strategy is in
articular successful when the entry threat occurs far in the future so
hat there is time enough to gradually build up the capital stock level
ecessary to deter entry, and/or when the entry cost for the entrant
s relatively large.
When the entry threat will occur relatively soon, and/or the cost
o enter is relatively small, entry deterrence requires too much in-
estments to be proﬁtable. This implies that the incumbent has to
ccommodate entry. It depends on the commitment structure of the
nderlying differential game how the incumbent will anticipate fu-
ure entry. In case of an open-loop differential game the incumbent
verinvests prior to the entry occurrence. This is because a higher
ncumbent capital stock raises the incumbent’s sales. This reduces
utput price, implying that the entrant will invest less in this market.
When we consider a Markov perfect equilibrium, the incumbent
lightly underinvests prior to entry. This is because in such an equi-
ibrium a higher market share is less persistent, because investment
ates are directly inﬂuenced by capital stocks of the own ﬁrm and of
he competitor. The entrant just has to increase its own capital stock
n order to reduce investments, and thus the increase of the capital
tock, of the incumbent. A second reason for anticipatoryunderinvest-
ent by the incumbent is that proﬁts are lower in a Markov perfect
quilibrium. This reduces the incentive to invest in this market.
Ourpaper analyzes a casewheremarket size is constant. Agrowing
rend would in fact work out on the ﬁrms’ investment decisions as if
hediscount ratewouldbe lower. Thiswill result inhigherﬁrmvalues,
mplying that entry deterrence will be a policy more worthwhile to
ursue. A shrinking market share will have the opposite effect, i.e.
his will decrease the discount rate, so that the current instantaneous
roﬁt will have a larger effect on the ﬁrms payoff. This implies that
he ﬁrm is less willing tomake extra immediate costs associated with
verinvestment. Hence, a decreasing market size will pursue a policy
f entry accommodation.
One important extension is to incorporate uncertainty in the anal-
sis, which is commonly present in the real world. From Huisman
nd Kort (in press) we know that more uncertainty enhances
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Ka policy of entry deterrence. However, in their framework the ﬁrms
are only allowed to invest once in a lumpy fashion. The current papers
framework allows ﬁrms to invest whenever they want, resulting in
various incremental changes of the capital stock. It would be inter-
esting to establish whether the Huisman–Kort result still holds when
our setting also includes uncertainty.
Another interesting topic for future research is to include inno-
vation, which is an important means of competition in today’s econ-
omy. A recent contribution is Dawid, Kopel, and Kort (2013), who
study a differential duopoly game with symmetric ﬁrms, where at
some unknownpoint in the future a product innovation can be imple-
mented. It would be interesting to incorporate product innovation in
our incumbent-entrant framework. In Dawid et al. (2013) innovation
arrival rates are exogenously given. It seems worthwhile to endoge-
nize the innovation process by taking R&D investments explicitly into
account.
Appendix A. Solution of the monopolistic period for exogenous T
Herewehaveausual optimal controlmodel that canbeusedby the
standard method. The Hamiltonian of problem (4) reads (we ignore
the time argument whenever it this does not lead to confusion)
Hmon = (A − K1)K1 − bI1 − c
2
I21 + μ1(I1 − δK1) (27)
whereμ1 denotes the adjoint variable for K1. The ﬁrst order condition
with respect to the control (investments) equals
HmonI1 = −b − cI1 + μ1 = 0 (28)
implying the following investment behavior
I1 = μ1 − b
c
. (29)
Finally the adjoint equation with respect to capital stock reads
μ˙1 = (r + δ)μ1 − A + 2K1. (30)
Using (29) in the capital dynamics, the optimal behavior is de-
scribed by the dynamical system (1) and (30), forwhichwe can derive
the following unique equilibrium values
KˆM1 =
A − (r + δ)b
2 + (r + δ)δc (31)
μˆM1 =
Acδ + 2b
2 + (r + δ)δc (32)
IˆM1 =
(
A − (r + δ)b)δ
2 + (r + δ)δc (33)
Linearizing the system around this equilibrium yields the following
eigenvalues of the Jacobian
ξ 1 =
r +
√
r2 + 4((r + δ)δ + 2
c
)
2
(34)
ξ 2 =
r −
√
r2 + 4((r + δ)δ + 2
c
)
2
(35)
Since 4((r + δ)δ + 2c ) > 0 and r > 0 it is obvious that ξ 1 > 0 and ξ 2 <
0 (both real). Thus the equilibrium is a saddle point.
In the full model presented in Section 2 the salvage value is deter-
mined by the value function of the second period, i.e. μ1(T) = SK1(·).
Since the system is of ﬁrst order the stable path can be calculated
analytically. The general solution of the model equals(
K1
μ1
)
=
(
KˆM1
μˆM1
)
+ c1eξ11 + c2eξ22 (36)herej is the eigenvector that corresponds to eigenvalue ξ j. Thus
K1
μ1
)
=
(
KˆM1
μˆM1
)
+ c1eξ1t
(
1
2
(ξ1 − r − δ)
1
)
+ c2eξ2t
(
1
2
(ξ2 − r − δ)
1
)
(37
Byusing the constraintsK(0)=K0 andμ1(T) = SK1 wecancalculate
1 and c2. We obtain
1 =
2
(
K10 − KˆM1
)− (ξ2 − r − δ)(SK1 − μˆM1 )e−ξ2T
(ξ1 − r − δ)− (ξ2 − r − δ)e(ξ1−ξ2)T
(38)
2 =
(ξ1 − r − δ)e−ξ2T
(
SK1 − μˆM1
)
(ξ1 − r − δ)− (ξ2 − r − δ)e(ξ1−ξ2)T
− 2e
(ξ1−ξ2)T(K10 − KˆM1 )
(ξ1 − r − δ)− (ξ2 − r − δ)e(ξ1−ξ2)T
(39)
sing them togetherwith (37) gives the solution for the ﬁnite horizon
ase (T <), which we need for our model.
For case without anticipation we also need the solution for the
nﬁnite horizon. In this case the optimal behavior is determined by
he stable manifold (i.e. c1 = 0). Thus
1(t) = KˆM1 + eξ2t
(
K10 − KˆM1
)
(40)
1(t) = μˆM1 + eξ2t
2
(
K10 − KˆM1
)
ξ2 − r − δ (41)
1(t) = δKˆM1 + eξ2t
2
(
K10 − KˆM1
)
c(ξ2 − r − δ) (42)
emark: Here c1 is still not deﬁned in closed form since the marginal
alvage value SK1(K1(T)) still depends on K1(T). This can only be done
ith the value function of the competition period which equal the
alvage value. This also depends on the information structure of the
ompetition period, i.e. open-loop or Markov perfect. Both cases will
e studied in the corresponding section.
ppendix B. Open-loop solution of the competition period
Within this section we present the key parts of the analysis of the
pen-loop solution of the competition period, as already presented
y Reynolds (1987). In the open-loop scenario optimal investments
re considered as functions of time only, i.e. Ii = Ii(t). The calculations
re presented for ﬁrm 1.
The Hamiltonian of ﬁrm 1 reads
O
1 = (A − K1 − K2)K1 − bI1 −
c
2
I21 + μ11(I1 − δK1)+ μ12(I2 − δK2)
(43)
here μij denotes ﬁrm i’s adjoint variable for the capital owned by
rm j. The ﬁrst order condition for investments
O
I1
= −b − cI1 + μ11 = 0 (44)
mplies the following investment behavior
1 = μ11 − b
c
. (45)
he adjoint equations for ﬁrm 1 read
˙ 11 = (r + δ)μ11 − (A − 2K1 − K2) (46)
˙ 12 = (r + δ)μ12 + K1 (47)
Thus the behavior in the competition period is described by the
-dimensional dynamical system (K1, K2, μ11, μ12, μ21, μ22). The
nique equilibrium equals for i = 1, 2
ˆO = A − b(r + δ)
3 + δc(r + δ) (48)
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ξ
ξ
ξ
ξ
ξ
ξ
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
w
t
a
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
S
K
c
c
a
K
I
μ
μ
a
t
K
o
w
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
A
a
A
8 Note that the lower integral bound equals T˜ and the discount factor e−r(t−T˜). How-
ever, we used a transformation to obtain the above form, which is easier (i.e. the
notation is easier) to deal with.ˆ ii = Acδ + 3b
3 + δc(r + δ) (49)
ˆ ij = − A − b(r + δ)
(r + δ)(3 + δc(r + δ)) (50)
iˆ =
δ
(
A − b(r + δ))
3 + δc(r + δ) (51)
To study the stability of the equilibriumwe look at the eigenvalues
f the Jacobian evaluated at the unique equilibrium, i.e.
O
1 =
r +
√
r2 + 4((r + δ)δ + 1
c
)
2
(52)
O
2 =
r −
√
r2 + 4((r + δ)δ + 1
c
)
2
(53)
O
3 =
r +
√
r2 + 4((r + δ)δ + 3
c
)
2
(54)
O
4 =
r −
√
r2 + 4((r + δ)δ + 3
c
)
2
(55)
O
5 = r + δ (56)
O
6 = r + δ (57)
Analogously to the monopolistic case it is obvious that
O
1 , ξ
O
3 , ξ
O
5 , ξ
O
6 > 0 and ξ
O
2 , ξ
O
4 < 0,which again implies a saddle point.
The general solution of the dynamical system can be found from
K1
K2
μ11
μ12
μ21
μ22
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
KˆO
KˆO
μˆO
ii
μˆO
ij
μˆO
ij
μˆO
ii
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+ c1eξO1 tO1 + c2eξ
O
2 tO2 + c3eξ
O
3 tO3
+c4eξO4 tO4 + c5eξ
O
5 tO5 + c6eξ
O
6 tO6 (58)
here O
i
is the eigenvector that corresponds to eigenvalue ξO
i
. Set-
ing the constant corresponding to positive eigenvalues (i.e. c1, c3, c5
nd c6) equal to zero we obtain the stable path. Thus we obtain
K1
K2
μ11
μ12
μ21
μ22
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
KˆO
KˆO
μˆO
ii
μˆO
ij
μˆO
ij
μˆO
ii
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+c2eξO2 t
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−ξO2 + r + δ
ξO2 − r − δ
−1
−1
1
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+c4eξO4 t
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ξO4 − r − δ
ξO4 − r − δ
3
1
1
3
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(59)
olving for the constants c2 and c4 by using K1(0) = K10 and K2(0) =
20 we get
2 = − (K10 − K20)
2
c
(
ξO2 + δ
)
(60)
4 =
(K10 + K20)− 2KˆOi
2
c
3
(
ξO4 + δ
)
(61)
nd
i(t) = KˆO + eξO2 t
Ki0 − Kj0
2
+ eξO4 t
(
Ki0 + Kj0
2
− Kˆi
)
(62)i(t)= δKˆO+
(
ξO2 +δ
)
eξ
O
2 t
Ki0 − Kj0
2
+ (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 t
(
Ki0 + Kj0
2
− Kˆi
)
(63)
ii(t) = μˆii + c
(
ξO2 + δ
)
eξ
O
2 t
Ki0 − Kj0
2
+ c(ξO4 + δ)eξO4 t
(
Ki0 + Kj0
2
− Kˆi
)
(64)
ij(t) = μˆij + c
(
ξO2 + δ
)
eξ
O
2 t
Ki0 − Kj0
2
+ c
3
(
ξO4 + δ
)
eξ
O
4 t
(
Ki0 + Kj0
2
− Kˆi
)
(65)
By using (62) and (63) together with the objective function we are
ble to calculate the value function of both players explicitly. Due to
he tedious calculation we only present the result for player 1 and
20 = 0, which we need as salvage function of the monopolist in the
pen-loop scenario. We get the following quadratic function
S(K1) =
[
Z1
r
+ KˆOi
Z2
ξO4 − r
− (KˆOi )2 Z52ξO4 − r −
1
2ξO4 − r
Z6
4
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Y1
+K1
[
− 1
ξO4 −r
Z2
2
− 1
ξO2 −r
Z3
2
+ 1
ξO2 +ξO4 −r
Z4
2
KˆOi +
1
2ξO4 − r
Z5Kˆ
O
i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Y2
+K21
[
− 1
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
Z4
4
− 1
2ξO4 − r
Z5
4
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Y3
= Y1 + Y2K1 + Y3K21
(66)
ith
1 = (A − KˆO)KˆO − bδKˆO − c
2
δ2KˆO
2 =
(− 4 − cδ(ξO4 + δ))KˆO + A − b(ξO4 + δ)
3 = A − 2KˆO −
(
ξO2 + δ
)
(b + cδKˆO)
4 = −2 − c
(
ξO2 + δ
)(
ξO4 + δ
)
5 = −2 − c
2
(
ξO4 + δ
)2
6 = − c
2
(
ξO2 + δ
)2
(67)
ppendix C. Value function parameters of Section 3
Calculated parameters of the value function of player 2 for a switch
t T˜8
2 :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
2
⎛
⎝(e(ξO2+ξO4 )t−e2ξO4 t)+c
(
ξO2 +δ
2
eξ
O
2 t− ξ
O
4 +δ
2
eξ
O
4 t
)2⎞⎠dt
= −1
2
⎡
⎣ 1
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
− 1
2ξO4 − r
+ c
(
ξO2 + δ
2
)2
1
2ξO2 − r
−c (ξ
O
2 + δ)(ξO4 + δ)
2
1
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
+ c
(
ξO4 + δ
2
)2
1
2ξO4 − r
⎤
⎦
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o
c
c
R
A
B
D
D
D
D
D
D
E
F
F
F
J
H
L
M
R
R
S
T
WB2 :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
1
2
(
b + c(δKˆOi − (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 tKˆOi ))((ξO2 + δ)eξO2 t
− (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 t)− 12 (A − 2KˆOi (1 − eξO4 t))(eξO2 t − eξO4 t)
− eξO4 t(1 − eξO4 t)KˆOi
]
dt
= −1
2
(
b + cδKˆO1
)(ξO2 + δ
ξO2 − r
− ξ
O
4 + δ
ξO4 − r
)
+ c
2
KˆO1
((
ξO2 + δ
)(
ξO4 + δ
)
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
−
(
ξO4 + δ
)2
2ξO4 − r
)
+ A
2
(
1
ξO2 − r
− 1
ξO4 − r
)
+ KˆO1
(
− 1
ξO2 − r
+ 1
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
+ 2
ξO4 − r
− 2
2ξO4 − r
)
C2 :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
(A − 2KˆOi (1 − eξ
O
4 t))(1 − eξO4 t)KˆOi
− c
2
(
KˆOi
)2(
δ − (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 t)2 − bKˆOi (δ − (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 t)] dt
= AKˆOi
(
1
r
+ 1
ξO4 − r
)
− 2(KˆOi )2
(
1
r
+ 2
ξO4 − r
− 1
2ξO4 − r
)
− c
2
(KˆOi )
2
(
δ2
r
+ 2δ(ξ
O
4 + δ)
(ξO4 − r)
− (ξ
O
4 + δ)2
2ξO4 − r
)
− bKˆOi
(
δ
r
+ ξ
O
4 + δ
ξO4 − r
)
(68)
Value function parameters for ﬁrm 1 if ﬁrm 1 enters the market.
A1 :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
2
⎛
⎝(e(ξO2+ξO4 )t+e2ξO4 t)−c
(
ξO2 +δ
2
eξ
O
2 t+ ξ
O
4 +δ
2
eξ
O
4 t
)2⎞⎠ dt
= −1
2
[
1
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
+ 1
2ξO4 − r
− c
( ξO2 + δ
2
)2 1
2ξO2 − r
− c
(
ξO2 + δ
)(
ξO4 + δ
)
2
1
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
− c
(
ξO4 + δ
2
)2
1
2ξO4 − r
⎤
⎦
B1 :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
1
2
(−b − c(δKˆOi − (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 tKˆOi ))((ξO2 + δ)eξO2 t
+ (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 t)− 12 (A − 2KˆOi (1 + eξO4 t))(eξO2 t + eξO4 t)
− eξO4 t(1 − eξO4 t)KˆOi
]
dt
= 1
2
(
b + cδKˆO1
)( ξO2 + δ
ξO2 − r
+ ξ
O
4 + δ
ξO4 − r
)
− c
2
KˆO1
((
ξO2 + δ
)(
ξO4 + δ
)
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
+
(
ξO4 + δ
)2
2ξO4 − r
)
+ A
2
(
1
ξO2 − r
+ 1
ξO4 − r
)
− KˆO1
(
1
ξO2 − r
+ 1
ξO2 + ξO4 − r
+ 2
2ξO4 − r
)C1 :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[(
A − 2KˆOi
(
1 + eξO4 t))(1 − eξO4 t)KˆOi
− c
2
(
KˆOi
)2(
δ − (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 t)2 − bKˆOi (δ − (ξO4 + δ)eξO4 t)] dt
= AKˆOi
(
1
r
+ 1
ξO4 − r
)
− 2(KˆOi )2
(
1
r
− 1
2ξO4 − r
)
− c
2
(
KˆOi
)2 (δ2
r
+ 2δ
(
ξO4 + δ
)
(ξO4 − r)
−
(
ξO4 + δ
)2
2ξO4 − r
)
− bKˆOi
(
δ
r
+ ξ
O
4 + δ
ξO4 − r
)
(69)
Parameters for the general solution of the optimal control problem
f the monopolist, if a certain capital stock K¯ should be reached at T.
¯2(K¯) =
K¯ − K10eξM1 T − KˆM1 (1 − eξ
M
1 T)
1
2
(eξ
M
2 T − eξM1 T)(ξM2 − r − δ)
¯1(K¯) =
K10 − KˆM1 − c¯22
(
ξM2 − r − δ
)
1
2
(
ξM1 − r − δ
) (70)
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